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COMMENTARY: 
BETWEEN KANT AND AL-SHABAAB
Tony Ward
I have been invited to comment on the two preceding chapters not as an 
international lawyer but as someone with an interest in both legal philosophy and 
state violence. Both chapters discuss a supposed ‘responsibility to democratise’ 
and its possible basis in, inter alia, Kant ’s philosophy. I make no claim to being 
a Kant scholar, but the most natural reading of Perpetual Peace and the relevant 
sections of Th e Metaphysics of Morals seems to me to be that all states ought to 
be republican (with separation of powers, and in some sense representative of the 
people, though not necessarily with an elected government), but that no state has 
the right to impose a republican constitution on another, except in very limited 
circumstances. I am not confi dent that this was Kant’s view, but if it was then 
(substituting ‘democratic’ for ‘republican’) I think he was right on both points. 
As I understand them (and I do not fi nd their argument easy to pin down), 
Beham and Janik think that acceptance of the fi rst point – the moral illegitimacy 
of undemocratic regimes – will support the extension of R2P to permit forcible 
democratisation in some circumstances. Jones I understand to be rejecting both 
forcible democratisation and universalist arguments for democracy.
Before turning to such matters as the interpretation of Kant, and in the spirit 
of Jones’s plea to understand those we may be tempted to brand as enemies of 
humanity, let me begin by introducing another voice into the conversation. 
It is that of the late Sheikh Abubakar Shariff  Ahmad, known as Makaburi,1 a 
prominent Muslim preacher in Mombasa, Kenya, whom I interviewed in January 
2013, three months before he was murdered, almost certainly by a paramilitary 
unit of the Kenyan police.2 Whether or not Makaburi was, as the police alleged, 
1 Th e interview was conducted by Dr Ian Patel (then of King’s College London) and me as part 
of the International State Crime Initiative’s ‘State Crime and Resistance: A Comparative 
Study of Civil Society’, funded by ESRC grant no. ES/I030816/1 (‘the ISCI project’). I would 
like to acknowledge the courtesy and hospitality shown by Makaburi as well as his willingness 
to engage in amicable debate.
2 See al-Jazeera Investigative Unit, Inside Kenya’s Death Squads <http://interactive.
aljazeera.com/aje/KenyaDeathSquads> accessed 21.12.2014.
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a leading recruiter of young Kenyans for the Somali armed group al-Shabaab,3 
he strongly defended the right of the al-Shabaab to establish an Islamic state in 
Somalia and impose a strict interpretation of Sharia law:
‘Th e Somalis have every right to govern themselves; I am a hundred percent for 
the Somalis to govern themselves under sharia law. I am a hundred percent for the 
Afghanis to govern themselves under sharia law, if that is their choice. I am a hundred 
percent for the Iraqis to govern themselves under sharia law. And if the Muslims in 
those countries don’t want democracy, then they have every right; and the Western 
governments have no right whatsoever to invade and force governments to govern the 
way they want.’
Th ere is a paradox in Makaburi’s argument against the ‘responsibility to 
democratise ’. He appeals to the Somalis’ right to choose their own government 
in order to defend their right to reject that very right, which is a basic principle 
of democracy . On the other hand there is also a paradox in considering it 
democratic to impose democracy on people who don’t want it.
Makaburi was probably right to think that al-Shabaab, and the Islamic 
Courts movement of which it was an off shoot, had won considerable support by 
imposing a legal code that brought a semblance of order and justice to a chaotic 
situation.4 It is not wholly implausible to argue that had they established a stable 
regime that was widely accepted as just because it accorded with the beliefs of 
most of those they governed, the state they created would have been exercising 
legitimate self-determination (in a political rather than legal sense) even if it was 
not democratic.5 But as Seyla Benhabib has argued, such a position is ultimately 
untenable.6 How can people be said to consent, particularly to such a draconian 
legal code as al-Shabaab’s, without a freedom to dissent,7 and how could that 
be secured except by an institution independent of the theocratic elite? How 
could the Somali people be said to exercise self-determination unless the views 
of all citizens were taken into account, including those who did not subscribe 
to a Salafi st interpretation of Islam? And so on. Th e sort of position Makaburi 
defended is perched precariously at the top of what Benhabib calls a ‘slippery 
slope towards democratic self-governance ’.8 What put Makaburi on this slope 
3 A. Qureshi, ‘Feeding Grievances: Th e Killing of Makaburi’ <www.aljazeera.com/indepth/
opinion/2014/04/feeding-grievances-killing-mak-2014411151431791922.html> accessed 
20.12.2014.
4 S.J. Hansen, Al-Shabaab in Somalia: Th e History and Ideology of a Militant Islamist Group, 
2005–12, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013.
5 For an argument that there can be self-determination without democracy see J. Cohen, ‘Is 
there a Human Right to Democracy?’ in C. Sypnowich (ed.), Th e Egalitarian Conscience: 
Essays in Honour of G.A. Cohen, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006.
6 S. Benhabib, Dignity in Adversity: Human Rights in Troubled Times, Polity Press, Cambridge, 
2011, Ch. 5.
7 A point stressed by Cohen (n. 5).
8 Benhabib (n. 6), p. 86.
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was his commendable willingness to engage in dialogue with people who did 
not share his religious beliefs. Benhabib’s central point is that a genuine dialogue 
between people from diff erent cultures and religions involves presuppositions 
that support the recognition of all participants as having an equal right to 
live under laws that are justifi ed by reasons they can accept, and that mutual 
recognition provides a universalist basis for human rights and democracy.
Arguments on these lines suggest that it is possible to develop a universalist 
account of human rights, including the right to democracy, which is not simply 
a colonialist extension of the norms of the USA and its allies.9 Th ey support 
Habermas ’s claim that basic rights ‘regulate matters of such generality that 
moral arguments are suffi  cient for their justifi cation. Th ese arguments show why 
the guarantee of such rules is in the interest of all persons qua persons, and thus 
why they are equally good for everyone.’10 But whether there are good arguments 
for democracy that should in principle be accepted even by the likes of Makaburi 
is quite a diff erent question from whether democracy should be imposed by 
military intervention in the guise of ‘police actions’ . Th ere is much force in 
Jones’s objections to Habermas ’s attempt to apply abstract philosophical theories 
to the realities of global power politics. To write about an imaginary world in 
which states and international organisations act out of disinterested regard for 
peace and human rights, as if it bore some relation to current political reality, 
does indeed seem dangerously naïve.
In his essay on Kant ’s Perpetual Peace, Habermas does recognise the danger 
of allowing states to rely on ‘unmediated’ moral argument to justify coercive 
action.11 Even though basic human rights have a universal moral justifi cation, 
their coercive implementation must be regulated by law. In its emphasis on law 
Habermas’s essay belongs to a later, less clearly utopian phase of his work than 
that criticised by Foucault. But while this might make Jones’s use of Foucault 
slightly beside the point, Habermas’s reliance on law by no means saves him 
from the charge of utopian naivety. He envisages human rights being enforced 
by ‘the police actions of a democratically legitimate world organization’12 and by 
international criminal trials. It is hard enough to regulate the routine policing of 
petty crime through the domestic criminal courts. To suppose that large-scale 
military interventions can be ‘civilized’ by the criminal trials of defeated leaders 
seems entirely unrealistic.
9 I discuss these issues in more detail in T. Ward, ‘State Crime and the Sociology of Human 
Rights’ (2013) Revista Critica Penal y Poder 77 <revistes.ub.edu/index.php/CriticaPenalPoder/
article/viewFile/6230/9955> accessed 21.12.2014.
10 J. Habermas, ‘Kant’s Idea of Perpetual Peace, with the Benefi t of Two Hundred Years’ 
Hindsight’ in J. Bohman and M. Lutz-Bachmann (eds.), Perpetual Peace: Essays on Kant’s 
Cosmopolitan Ideal, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1997, p. 138.
11 Ibid., p. 140.
12 Ibid.
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Th ough I am sympathetic to this aspect of Jones’s critique of Habermas, I fi nd 
some of his criticisms of Habermas’s larger philosophical project less convincing. 
For one thing, I suspect that one would have to go a very long way indeed to 
fi nd a society so isolated from modernity that it did not give rise to ‘decentred 
subjects’ capable of refl ecting on their own culture.13 Formerly isolated 
premodern cultures – in Papua New Guinea, for example14 – must, simply 
because they are no longer isolated, fi nd ways of refl ecting on and redefi ning 
their own values and customs as well as those of postcolonial culture.15 Th e 
language of rights and self-determination serves as a lingua franca that can 
be used to articulate radically diff erent perspectives, as when Papua New 
Guineans use it to defend their rights under customary law , or when Makaburi 
used it to defend Islamist authoritarianism. I also think that Jones exaggerates 
the uniformity of Habermas’s vision of cosmopolitan law. Habermas does not 
envisage ‘one world order and one set of rights’.16 Universal rights in his scheme 
are merely ‘placeholders’17 to be fi lled in by what Benhabib calls ‘democratic 
iterations’, that is, concrete specifi cations of these abstract rights that refl ect 
the democratic will of particular peoples.18 I am not a fan of Habermas ’s global 
police, but I don’t think they would be sent in to enforce gay rights or reverse 
headscarf bans, unless gays or headscarf-wearers could be portrayed as potential 
victims of atrocities. Laudable as both objectives are, they would have to be 
achieved by democratic political struggle, which would not be banished from a 
Habermasian world.
Further, I am slightly puzzled by Jones’s view of Rwanda. If ever there was 
a case where bystander states were morally (and, arguably, legally)19 obliged 
to intervene, by force if necessary, this was surely it. Although the Rwandan 
massacres predated the ICJ’s clarifi cation of the duty to prevent genocide,20 Hazel 
Cameron’s research shows that UK Foreign Offi  ce offi  cials, and in particular 
the then Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd, avoided using the word ‘genocide’ 
13 Jones, this volume, text to n. 59.
14 Th e ISCI project (n. 1 above) includes a study, conducted primarily by Kristian Lasslett of 
the University of Ulster, of groups working on development-related and human rights issues 
in Papua New Guinea. Th e communal discussions organised by the Bismarck Ramu Group 
(<bismarckramugroup.org>) are especially good examples of the kind of cultural refl ection 
I have in mind.
15 Th e danger here is that the (post)colonial regime appropriates and redefi nes the premodern 
culture to suit its own purposes: see for example R.J. Gordon and M.J. Meggitt, Law and 
Order in the New Guinea Highlands, New England Universities Press, Hanover, NH, 1985, Ch. 7.
16 Jones, this volume, text to n. 69.
17 J. Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, tr. W. Rehg, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1996, p. 126.
18 Benhabib (n. 6), p. 126.
19 See J. Heieck, this volume, on the duty to prevent genocide as a jus cogens norm.
20 ICJ, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 
(Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), judgment of 26 February 2007, discussed 
by L. Poli in this this volume.
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because they feared that they would have a legal duty to intervene.21 Jones is 
right to point out that the economic policies of global elites helped to create the 
conditions in which genocide became possible. But that is all the more reason 
why the major powers should have accepted some responsibility for averting the 
genocide. If all Jones means to argue is that criticism of the failure to intervene 
can distract attention from other aspects of genocide prevention then I am happy 
to agree with him.
Beham and Janik discuss whether there may be a ‘responsibility to 
democratise’ in international law, and they consider – without reaching any 
defi nite conclusion – whether a basis for such a responsibility might be found 
in the work of Kant . Th at Kant should be enlisted as a supporter of ‘R2D’ is, on 
the face of it, surprising, as his position on the matter seems quite unequivocal: 
‘No nation shall forcibly interfere with the constitution and government of 
another’.22 However, there are two situations where forcible democratisation is 
arguably compatible with Kant’s view, and where it is also defensible today. First, 
consider the passage where Kant argues that a state should not intervene in a 
civil war in another state because this would ‘violate the rights of an independent 
people struggling with its internal ills’.23 It would be strange for Kant to 
say that a people has the right to resolve its internal ills by war, since ‘reason 
absolutely condemns war as a means of determining the right’.24 What does 
make sense is for Kant to maintain that while only a republican constitution can 
bring internal strife to a just conclusion, the people in question must be left  to 
arrive for themselves, however painfully, at the position where a constitutional 
settlement is possible. Only then can the government that eventually emerges 
truly represent the people’s will. Suppose, however, that a people already has 
a republican constitution, and a rebel group seeks to overthrow it and install 
a despotic regime. In these circumstances the republican (or in today’s terms, 
democratic) government, as the legitimate representative of the people, might be 
thought to have the right to call on other states for help – even if the would-be 
despots have seized control of its entire territory. Intervention to restore 
democracy, as in Sierra Leone and the other examples discussed by Franck25 
could be justifi ed on this principle.
Th e one instance where Kant explicitly endorses the imposition of a 
republican constitution is when, in Part I of Th e Metaphysics of Morals 
21 H. Cameron, ‘British State Complicity in Genocide: Rwanda 1994’ (2012) 1 State Crime 
70. See also H. Cameron, Britain’s Hidden Role in the Rwandan Genocide: Th e Cat’s Paw, 
Routledge, Abingdon, 2013, pp. 104–6.
22 I. Kant, Perpetual Peace and Other Essays, tr. T. Humphrey, Hackett, Indianapolis, 1983, 
p. 346.
23 Ibid.
24 Ibid., p. 356.
25 T.M. Franck, ‘Th e Emerging Right to Democratic Governance’ (1992) 86 American Journal 
of International Law 46, 65 et seq., cited by Beham and Janik in this volume, n. 35.
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(confusingly known in English as either Th e Doctrine of Right or Th e 
Metaphysical Elements of Justice), he discusses the rights of states that have 
defeated an ‘unjust enemy’.26 States that have overcome such an enemy, Kant 
writes, have no right to ‘divide its territory among themselves’ but they do have 
the right to install a republican government that will be unlikely to launch 
aggressive wars in future. Th is foreshadows what was done, rather successfully, 
in (West) Germany and Japan, and attempted with much less success in Iraq and 
Afghanistan.
An ‘unjust enemy’ according to Kant is one whose ‘publicly expressed will 
(whether by word or deed) reveals a maxim’ that would make peace among 
nations impossible.27 Carl Schmitt , writing during and aft er the dying days 
of the Nazi regime he had supported, was understandably anxious at Kant’s 
evocation of ‘this frightful enemy against whom the law has no limits’ and 
whose mere ‘verbally expressed will […] justifi es common action in order to 
maintain the freedom of the one who feels threatened. A preventive war against 
such an enemy would be considered to be even more than a just war. It would 
be a crusade’.28 Th is is what Beham and Janik call the ‘small step toward […] 
embracing radical interventionism as a means to overcome the quintessential 
security dilemma in a world lacking a hegemon endowed with the monopoly on 
force’.29
Whether Kant’ s argument should be read as Schmitt read it is doubtful. 
An alternative reading, more consistent with Kant’s other remarks on jus ad 
bellum ,30 is that mere verbal expressions may reveal a state as unjust, but only 
deeds (albeit a rather broad category of deeds, including repudiating treaties or 
upsetting the balance of power) can make it an unjust enemy. Kant’s remarks 
are undeniably ambiguous, however, and a reading according to which refusing 
to adopt a republican constitution would suffi  ce to brand a state as an ‘unjust 
enemy’ is not implausible.31 Be that as it may, the position Schmitt attributed to 
Kant has to be taken seriously, if only because it is so close to the coalition’s view 
of Iraq in 2003. Quite apart from the illegality and immorality of that war, the 
fate of ‘democratisation’ in Iraq vividly illustrates why intervention to install (as 
opposed to restoring) democracy is generally such a bad idea. Th e very existence 
of the Iraqi state – unquestionably a vile despotism under Saddam Hussein’s 
rule – was the product Britain and France’s thoroughly un-Kantian conduct 
in dividing up the territory of the Ottoman Empire without any regard to the 
26 I. Kant, Th e Metaphysics of Morals, tr. M. Gregor, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
1991, pp. 155–156.
27 Ibid., p. 155.
28 C. Schmitt, Th e Nomos of the Earth, tr. G. Ulmen, Telos Press, New York, 2003, p. 169.
29 Th is volume, text following n. 20.
30 Kant (n. 27), pp. 152–153.
31 S. Benhabib, ‘Carl Schmitt’s Critique of Kant: Sovereignty and International Law’ (2012) 40 
Political Th eory 688.
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wishes of its people or any sense of national identity. By shielding Iraqi Kurdistan 
against a renewal of Saddam Hussein’s genocidal violence (but without, it should 
be noted, at that stage promoting either regime change or full secession),32 the 
USA and its allies had created the conditions for moderately successful state-
building eff orts in that region. Th e population of Iraq as a whole, however, 
was not remotely a ‘people’ that was disposed to unite itself under a legitimate 
constitution. As Charles Tripp wrote in 2000, Iraq was a state in which
‘the idea of politics as civility […] has generally been overwhelmed by people 
organized according to very diff erent notions of trust, where the community is not 
one of citizens, but of family and clan members, fellow tribesmen and conspirators. 
Th ey have tended to see the state as the guarantor of their own privileges […].’33
Under the circumstances it is not surprising that the result of the 
‘democratisation’ of Iraq was fi rst the chaos that peaked in 200734 and then the 
‘tyranny of the majority’ of the al-Maliki regime. Beham and Janik recognise 
the danger of ‘tyranny of the majority’ but the lesson they draw from it – that 
democracy is ‘not an end in itself ’ – does not seem to me to be quite the right 
one. Rather, democracy is an end in itself, but there is more to democracy than 
majority rule . It involves the coexistence, as Habermas says, of human rights 
and  popular sovereignty . Whether the “end” is democracy or, as Kant thought, 
a “republican” government that would not necessarily be democratic, the central 
question here is what means the end can justify.
Beham and Janik argue that when states act in the name of ‘R2P’ the true 
objective is invariably regime change or secession, and this ought to be openly 
acknowledged. Th ere is at least one exception to this generalisation, namely the 
French ‘Operation Turquoise’ in Rwanda in 1994. Far from aiming to overthrow 
the genocidal regime, the French have been suspected of wanting to keep it 
in power.35 But though certainly too little and too late, the operation did save 
lives. In any case, I am far from convinced that the use of R2P as a pretext for 
regime change aff ords any good reason to legitimise the latter. Humanitarian 
intervention may be justifi ed in cases of genocide or other mass atrocities by 
the ordinary moral reasoning that justifi es one person in intervening to protect 
another from unjust attack. Th e result of such intervention may be the fall of the 
perpetrator regime. When such an ‘unjust enemy’ is overthrown, both respect 
for the right of self-determination and the avoidance of future atrocities aff ord 
reasons for the intervening states to encourage the formation of as democratic 
a successor regime as is realistically possible. But regime change should be a 
32 Cf. the penultimate paragraph of Beham and Janik’s chapter.
33 C. Tripp, A History of Iraq, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2000, p. 2.
34 P. Green and T. Ward, ‘Th e Transformation of Violence in Iraq’ (2009) 49 British Journal of 
Criminology 609.
35 A. des Forges, Leave None to Tell the Story, Human Rights Watch, New York, 1999.
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by-product of humanitarian intervention, not a reason for it. No doubt ostensibly 
humanitarian motives are oft en a cloak for other reasons for intervention, but a 
licence to wage, in the name of democracy, what Beham and Janik nicely call 
‘perpetual war for perpetual peace’ would be open to even greater abuse.
Th e whole idea that states have a ‘responsibility to democratise’ other states 
should in my view be fi rmly rejected. Th e citizens of every state have a moral 
right to democratic governance but the responsibility to democratise rests with 
them, painful and dangerous as that process may be. If democracy endures 
in Tunisia, for example, it will be a tribute to the activists, both Islamist and 
secularist, who created and sustained a civil society in the interstices of Ben 
Ali’s authoritarian rule.36 Civil societies in authoritarian states do not work in 
isolation, but draw sustenance from their links with a global civil society of pro-
democracy, pro-human rights organisations.37 Democratic states should do what 
they can by peaceful means to assist the spread of democracy and human rights 
through civil society.38 One way they can do that is by further democratising 
themselves. It does not help the cause of democracy when the Kenyan state 
murders opponents on the streets of Mombasa or when the USA tortures with 
impunity. Democracy, unlike charity, begins at home.
36 Again this point is drawn from the ISCI project (n. 1). See P. Green, ‘State Crime, Civil 
Society and Resistance: Lessons from Tunisia’ <https://www.opendemocracy.net/penny-
green/state-crime-civil-society-and-resistance-lessons-from-tunisia> accessed 23.12.2014.
37 T. Risse, S.C. Ropp and K. Sikkink (eds.), Th e Power of Human Rights: International Norms 
and Domestic Change, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1999.
38 Here I endorse the views of Benhabib (n. 6), and also A. Honneth’s view of how to apply 
Kant to the present day: ‘Is Universalism a Moral Trap? Th e Presuppositions and Limits of a 
Politics of Human Rights’ in Bohman and Lutz-Bachmann (n. 10), pp. 174–176.
